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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores spiritual and aesthetic cultural values associated with ecosystems. We argue that these
values are not best captured by instrumental or consequentialist thinking, and they are grounded in conceptions
of nature that diﬀer from the ecosystem services conceptual framework. To support our case, we engage with
theories of the aesthetic and the spiritual, sample the discourse of ‘wilderness’, and provide empirical evidence
from the recent UK National Ecosystem Assessment Follow-on Phase. We observe that accounts of spiritual and
aesthetic value in Western culture are diverse and expressed through diﬀerent media. We recognise that
humans do beneﬁt from their aesthetic and spiritual experiences of nature. However, aesthetic and spiritual
understandings of the value of nature lead people to develop moral responsibilities towards nature and these are
more signiﬁcant than aesthetic and spiritual beneﬁts from nature. We conclude that aesthetic and spiritual
values challenge economic conceptions of ecosystems and of value (including existence value), and that an
analysis of cultural productions and a plural-values approach are needed to evidence them appropriately for
decision-making.
1. Introduction
Aesthetic and spiritual values of ecosystem are frequently men-
tioned in the literature about the valuation of ecosystem services. In the
major reports such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005)
(MA) spiritual and aesthetic values are included in the tables of values.
A search across all the MA reports reveals 227 occurrences of ‘aesthetic’
and 335 of ‘spiritual’. Sometimes they are brieﬂy described by single
adjectives. A list of such adjectives applied to spiritual from The
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB, 2010, all volumes)
is fairly typical: spiritual renewal; spiritual enlightenment; spiritual
beneﬁts – i.e. existence value; spiritual enrichment; spiritual experi-
ence; spiritual identity; spiritual use; spiritual enlightenment. The
collective sense of these adjectives is that spiritual value is akin to the
psychological beneﬁt encounters with ecosystems can bring; a similar
understanding is also implied for aesthetic value. Whereas this
approach appears to presume the cultural context of Western devel-
oped nations, an alternative approach is also evident. Here the focus is
on traditional, rural cultures - either in developing countries or
indigenous groups, such as First Nation Canadians, in developed ones
- and the primary beneﬁt is understood to be the maintenance of their
culture (Cooper, 2016). There is a good number of studies of these
cultures that explore their spiritual and aesthetic approaches to the
environment around them, conceptualised by the researchers, if not
their research subjects, under the heading of ecosystem services (e.g.
Adamowicz et al., 1998; Ishii et al., 2010), especially on the way
indigenous people relate spiritually to their natural contexts (e.g.
Abram et al., 2014; Pert et al., 2015).
These valuable studies are not yet matched by a similar attention to
aesthetic and spiritual values of ecosystems in the developed, highly-
economised cultures of the West, i.e. countries such as Britain. Here
the characterisation of the aesthetic and spiritual within the ecosystem
services literature remains underdeveloped (Church et al., 2011; La
Rosa et al., 2016, who also claim that inattention to cultural ecosystem
services (CES) leads to them having little impact on decision-making).
Layke (2009), in compiling and assessing current ecosystems services
indicators, found no measures of spiritual or religious beneﬁts from
nature, and our review has found no new monetary techniques for
valuing these beneﬁts. However, new work is appearing (e.g. Bieling,
2014; Bryce et al., 2016 in this issue; Daniel et al., 2012; Hernandez-
Morcillo et al., 2013; Kanowski and Williams, 2009; Kenter et al.,
2016a in this issue). Spiritual motivations for protecting ecosystems
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may also be stronger following the lead of the Pope's encyclical
(Francis, 2015; see also Cafaro (2015)).
Several explanations for this limited attention to CES may be
oﬀered. Cultural services are often not discrete, but bundled up with
others, e.g. Canadian salmon have cultural values as well as food value
(Klain et al., 2014), they are not easily localised (Klain and Chan,
2012), and changes in them are not measurably marginal or well-
correlated with other ecosystem services (Kirchoﬀ, 2012); CES are
everywhere and nowhere (Chan et al., 2016). This makes them hard to
quantify, let alone price, and so attention mostly goes to CES like
recreation (Chan et al., 2012a) that are easy to measure (Milcu et al.,
2013). Spiritual value is a prime example of this and so it is sometimes
exempted from the Total Economic Valuation process (TEEB, 2008;
Turner et al., 2003).
With these diﬃculties come calls for more work by social scientists
to work on them (e.g. Daniel et al., 2012). The UK National Ecosystem
Assessment (NEA) did involve social scientists, especially two work
programmes of the Follow-On (on cultural services and on shared
values). Intriguingly, an ‘Arts and Humanities’ report came to be
written as an annex to the cultural services report in response to the
advocacy of the main work programme (Church et al., 2014). However,
most arts and humanities work on the relation of culture and nature
occurs without reference to the ﬁeld of ecosystem services research.
Where there is engagement across these academic disciplines the
encounter may be experienced as ‘fraught’ (Satterﬁeld et al., 2013).
Fish (2011) remarks that cultural theorists may be more inclined to
critique the CES ﬁeld than support it and James (2015) claims that
those who call for arts and humanities engagement in the Valuing
Ecosystem Services movement (or VES movement for short) do not
really want the arts and humanities world to challenge its dominant
assumptions of value.
This paper develops some of the arts and humanities contribution
to Work package 6 on shared, plural and cultural values of the NEA
Follow-On (Kenter et al., 2014). True to form, it challenges the
dominant assumption of value in Valuing Ecosystem Services (VES)
(‘services’) and its dominant conceptions of nature (‘ecosystems’). We
argue that the core conceptual framework of ecosystem valuations (that
combines science and economics) is at odds with the conceptual
frameworks for beauty and the spiritual that are in common use in
Western cultures, however dominated by economic thought these
cultures appear to be. The aesthetic and the spiritual are refractory
under the discourse of ecosystem services valuation. We argue that they
are contrary ontologically in their conceptions of nature and axiologi-
cally in their conceptions of the value relationship between nature and
human life.
This work is a response to calls for arts and humanities involvement
speciﬁcally in conceptual studies (Milcu et al., 2013) and for work in
industrialised and urban societies (Gomez-Baggethun and Barton,
2013). This paper asks what are the conceptions of nature and of value
that typify aesthetic and spiritual discourses in Britain as an example of
Western culture. (The use of the term ‘ecosystem’ rather than ‘nature’
at this point would prejudge the issue.) ‘Discourse’ is used in the wide
sense of any communication around nature and value, perhaps printed
text or common conversation, intentional artworks or incidental
cultural artefacts (Castree, 2013), in fact, any type of cultural produc-
tion. We direct the attention of the VES community to the method of
interpreting these cultural productions to elucidate the values a society
places on nature. We emphasise, alongside some other voices (e.g.
Comberti et al., 2015; Fish and Saratsi, 2015; Winthrop, 2014), that
there is a recognition of duties to nature as well as beneﬁts that ﬂow
from nature.
With other papers in this special issue of Ecosystem Services we
share the view that these discourses fall under the cultural category of
ecosystem services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). We
share the perspective that they are plural in that there is a variety of
conceptions that may conﬂict with other conceptions held in a
particular society; speciﬁcally they may conﬂict with attempts to reduce
value to instrumental value, including economic or monetary value.
Further, we agree they are shared in the sense that the ‘formation’ of
these conceptions and evaluations (Kenter et al., 2016b in this issue,
2016c in this issue) is a shared and social process and also that the
implications of these valuations apply to people collectively as a society
or community and not to them merely as an aggregation of individuals
(Irvine et al., 2016 in this issue; Kenter et al., 2015).
We begin our conceptual analysis by setting out a common
conceptual framework adopted by much VES work as a framing
metaphor, though contested by others. We then compare that with
the conceptions of nature and value in aesthetics and spirituality. In
doing this we are (1) answering the call for arts and humanities
engagement, (2) attending to the neglected ﬁeld of aesthetic and
spiritual value in the Western world, and (3) supporting those voices
in the ﬁeld with further arguments that there are duties to nature as
well as beneﬁts from nature. In Section 3 we advocate a method of
interpretation of discourses and cultural productions, a method yet to
be adopted by the VES community. In this second section we ﬁrst
discuss the method before exploring the idea (trope) of wilderness and
what that reveals about aesthetic and spiritual values of nature. Others
in this special issue report on evidence of spiritual and aesthetic value
in deliberative and interpretive-deliberative ecosystem service valua-
tion exercises (in this issue: Bryce et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2016;
Fish et al., 2016b; Kenter et al., 2016a; Kenter, 2016; Ranger et al.,
2016), so in Section 4 we include some of this evidence to illustrate
consilience with our analysis. We end by discussing our conclusions in
relation to other VES work and join the chorus advocating maintaining
a plurality of values up to the point of decision-making.
2. Conceptual analysis
It would be surprising if the term ‘ecosystem services’ was in
frequent use among aestheticians and those writing about nature and
spirit; they will have their own favourite terminology (Williams, 1976).
But behind any terminological diﬀerences, are there fundamental
similarities in the conceptions of nature? The literature around VES
has attempted to set out a clear conceptual framework. This has
evolved and may diﬀer in detail among research programmes, but
there is a common core with two elements: a taxonomy of beneﬁts in a
Total Economic Value (TEV) (Common International Classiﬁcation of
Ecosystem Services (CICES) version 4.3, 2013; de Groot et al., 2002;
MA, 2005) (which is an implicit axiology), and a model of how these are
produced – ﬂows from stocks (an implicit ontology). Both have become
widespread: “bodies of knowledge so persuasive as to seem unrheto-
rical – to seem, simply, the way the world is” (Gross, 1990, about
science in general). Yet neither are uncontested, particularly by those
who point out that they are metaphors that may help understanding in
some circumstances, but though they highlight some things, they hide
others (Jax et al., 2013; Larson et al., 2011; Norton and Noonan,
2007). There are implicit ethical dimensions in the choice of metaphors
(Cooper, 2000a) and criticisms of the dominant models include
Norgaard (2010), for the way they blind us to the need for major
institutional change, Luck et al. (2012), for excluding potential
motivations, and Tadaki et al. (2015), for imposing a rationality on
other people.
The language of natural capital and ecosystem services maps onto
the metaphor of stocks and ﬂows. The account of the ‘ﬂow’ has been
developing: consider the two-box diagram at the head of the MA report
in 2005 (ecosystem services to human well-being) and then the six-
column diagram from the UK NEA (2011) (ecosystem processes,
through ecosystem services, to goods and their value). The ‘cascade
model’ of Haines-Young and Potschin (2010) and Potschin and Haines-
Young (2011) is particularly clear and continues to be developed
(Spangenberg et al., 2014; Fish et al., 2016a in this issue). In this
cascade model humans and the economy are seen as part of an
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overarching whole, but they are set at one end of a transaction chain. At
the other end is what might loosely be termed nature conceived as a
functioning system, an ecosystem, which is inﬂuenced by human
interactions (for good or ill), but at this end of the cascade the human
actors are diagrammatically external to the ecosystems, a bit like
production engineers (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010). These
ecosystems are analysed analogously to complex machines, in which
the greatest interest is in their processes and outputs rather than in
their components (so long as the processes and their outputs are
maintained, it does not matter much if the working components are
swapped for others of equal eﬀectiveness). Interestingly, Jax et al.
(2013), whose illustration of a simpliﬁed cascade provides the base for
a series of ethical questions, include the question of the appropriate-
ness and purpose of the model itself in the illustration. An alternative
model is Ostrom's (2007, 2009) ‘Social-Ecological System’ Framework,
that may come to be adopted by the VES world, even as it continues to
develop (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014). It is more complex than the
cascade model in its account of the human element, yet the basic
dualism of resource and agent remains. Raymond et al. (2013) point
out that these VES frameworks are all production metaphors that
frame the problem as maximising human beneﬁts. They go on to
recommend consideration of other metaphors. This we now do in
contrasting this ontological framework with that adopted when speak-
ing of the beauty of Nature.
Furthermore, theories of valuation (axiology) also will look very
diﬀerent if one is asking about beauty. There are diﬀerent perspectives
among those who value nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons and
those working in the VES ﬁeld (Satterﬁeld et al., 2013; Setten et al.,
2012; Winthrop, 2014). The VES literature may debate the adequacy of
monetary value to capture all that is thought important (TEEB, 2008),
but there appears to be a consensus that what is to be valued is ‘what
nature does for us’ (Defra, 2015; Juniper, 2013).
The standard VES model attends to ecosystem processes that
produce goods and services that are of beneﬁt to humans. Some of
these beneﬁts are clearly economic, others, e.g. health beneﬁts, may
best be assessed independently from the economic, and still others, the
rather ineﬀable cultural beneﬁts such as the spiritual and the aesthetic,
may have to be left as uncertainly characterised until new methods to
integrate their values are established (Bateman et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, all these values exist because humans are receiving
beneﬁts, whether as satisﬁed preferences, improved health, inner calm,
or, most tenuously, the satisfaction of knowing that something exists in
the world even if one has no other beneﬁt from it (the economists’
existence value; Mace and Bateman, 2011). All these values are species
of consequentialist value. Are there other types of value that people
concerned with beauty or the spiritual might aﬃrm?
2.1. Nature and value in aesthetics
Visual beauty, especially of landscape, is often where aesthetic
valuing begins but this narrow conception is also critiqued (Brady,
2003; Carlson, 2000, 2010; Saito, 1998). The visual approach is the
natural outcome of the interaction of pictorial studies with the direct
appreciation of nature senso lato. This ‘scenery model’, a legacy of the
picturesque movement, is problematized by Carlson (2000, 2010).
Aesthetics as a discipline is greatly inﬂuenced by reﬂection on human
artworks because these visual representations and interpretations of
life may communicate beauty more deeply than can language. The
common term ‘landscape’ is derived from painterly studies ‘landskips’
(Hutcheson, 2004; Wylie, 1998). The view from a particular vantage
point and framed as a scene, at least mentally, is what is assessed for
scenic aesthetic value. This conception shares with ‘ecosystems’ a
distancing of the human subject from the environmental object that
is under scrutiny. However, attention is directed, as in a painting, to the
actual component parts of the view and their static composition rather
than to dynamic processes that may not be visually obvious.
Attention to literature, and to conversations of the general public, is
reminding people that there is more to natural beauty than the purely
visual, and certainly more than the static scene (Brady, 2003; Carlson
2000, 2010; Selman and Swanwick 2009). Berleant (1992, 2013) has
argued strongly for an ‘aesthetics of engagement’ which breaks down
distancing, and embraces more immersive, multisensory appreciation.
The scent of the pine trees, hands stroked through ears of barley, the
wind on one's face accompanied by scudding clouds and their shadows;
these also are beautiful. Now the human subject is integral and is
becoming an object within it, an object subjected to wind and rain,
impressed upon by odours, physically exhausted by labouring within it
(as walker, gardener, farm labourer). Hepburn (1984:13), for example,
points to how aesthetic experience of nature oﬀers opportunities for
reﬂexivity; we are ‘involved in the natural situation itself … both actor
and spectator, ingredient in the landscape ….we are in nature and a
part of nature; we do not stand over against it as over against a painting
on a wall.’ Nature is a co-production of non-human happenings, from
geological processes to seed germination, and the long history of
human culture (Fish et al., 2016a in this issue), especially ‘agri-culture’
(Pretty, 2002). The aesthetic shaping of nature by humans arises not
merely from the practical, but involves moulding nature to an aesthetic.
Cooper and Lonsdale (2004) provide an example of how observations
of ancient trees lead to a cultural image of an ideal ‘ancient (or veteran)
tree’ that is then put into eﬀect through arboricultural practices that
shape real trees to meet the ideal. The present relationships of humans
and the rest of nature generate structures, products and, signiﬁcantly,
meaning (Fischer and Eastwood, 2016). Humans are no longer set
apart as engineers and consumers.
Of course humans draw beneﬁts from this. We desire what makes
life worth living. The beauty around us brings joy, solace, inspiration; it
is life-enhancing (Brady, 2006). At times we shall seek this out in
special landscapes that have been accorded the status of being
noteworthily pretty (such places may have oﬃcial designations in
Britain such as National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural
Beauty). We are prepared to spend money and eﬀort on going on
holiday to such places. Policy makers are interested in this and
commission studies (Swanwick et al., 2006). These may identify
widely-shared subjective preferences that are temporally stable, such
as for openness and remoteness (Daniel et al., 2012; Natural England,
2009). These preferences can be subsumed into the VES paradigm. Not
so readily subsumed is the beauty of the unpretty and the daily - the
falling of dying leaves, the miniscule symmetry of a ﬂower of a common
weed, perhaps. Conceptual attention here is shifting away from
beneﬁts-to-the-observer to something less dependent on the individual
pleasure seeker. Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant and
Hutcheson used the concept of disinterestedness in their analysis of
aesthetics. This was not indiﬀerence to beauty. Disinterestedness
referred to a separation of aesthetic value from both an interest in an
object as a means of sensory gratiﬁcation and from an interest in using
it as a means to some utilitarian end (Kant, 2000: 91ﬀ). Kant also
distinguished what he called judgements of the agreeable from judge-
ments of taste (or beauty). For Hutcheson (2004: 25) also, the pleasure
which accompanies beauty is ‘distinct from that Joy which arises from
Self-love upon Prospect of Advantage.’ This can be translated into
contemporary debates in aesthetics as the distinction between aesthetic
preference, a subjective expression of liking, and aesthetic judgement.
Aesthetic judgements are normative in that some judgements are better
or more reliable than others. They are also judgements of value, often
expressed as a narrative rather than as a scalar comparator, least of all
as a computable numeric. They are largely independent of the
individual prejudices that are bound up in subjective preferences.
The debate is over what the bases of these normative evaluations are,
and what kinds of reasons can be provided to support them in contrast
to preferences.
A common approach argues that the aesthetic response (which
underlies ascriptions of aesthetic value) is correctly characterised as
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involving attention to the qualities of the object for their own sake
(Carroll, 2012; Iseminger, 2006). For example, aesthetically appreciat-
ing swans in a tree-lined lake on a summer's day rests on its aesthetic
qualities, perhaps the snowy white feathers, graceful forms and elegant
display of the swans within an attractive setting. This illustrates how
aesthetic appreciation is not concerned with valuing the birds and lake
as a kind of resource, where they serve some instrumental end.
Pleasure arises secondarily from that engagement with those qualities
which are appreciated for their individual distinctiveness. In this
respect, the interest we take from an aesthetic perspective is focused
on the natural thing in question, rather than on our own satisfaction
(Stecker, 2003).
One implication is that although aesthetic value involves pleasure
or liking, that pleasure cannot be detached from the object-centred
appreciation of particular aesthetic qualities in the natural world. It is
readily possible for the observer to obtain similar levels of psycholo-
gical pleasure in ways other than looking at the swans, e.g. through a
good meal. It is not possible for the aesthetic judgement of the qualities
of the swans to be replaced by a substitute experience, e.g. looking at
swans on another lake, as the judgement is of that particular lake and
not the personal experience. Secondly, although such pleasure may be
considered a beneﬁt to those who experience it – perhaps it enhances
their well-being – it is a secondary outcome of aesthetic attention to the
world. The aesthetic judgement is timeless in that, once made, the
judgement stands. It may be revised on further reﬂection or experience,
but it cannot be repeated. However, the pleasure experience of viewing
the swans is located in a moment of time, accessible later merely as
memory. It may be repeated at a return visit, but if there is less
pleasure in this second visit that does not change/revise the pleasure at
the ﬁrst visit. One can say, “I think Lake Windermere is beautiful”
(present continuous); but, “I enjoyed seeing Lake Windermere” (simple
past). In this way, aesthetic value is a form of non-instrumental value.
Another relevant line of argument concerns the objectivity of
aesthetic value, even if not its universality. The theory of ‘scientiﬁc
cognitivism’ argues that aesthetic judgments have objective force on
the condition that they are informed by scientiﬁc knowledge (Parsons,
2008). The most well established position, Carlson's (2000) ‘natural
environmental model’, rests on an argument by analogy. It is argued
that in art appreciation, art history and criticism provide the founda-
tion of informed judgments. For environmental aesthetics, instead,
Carlson claims that the most legitimate and ‘objective’ source will be
the natural sciences, such as geology and biology. Such knowledge, the
argument goes, will ensure aesthetic judgments accord with their
objects, enabling a grasp of relevant aesthetic qualities. In Carlson's
own example, if one were to appreciate a whale without knowing it to
be a ‘mammal,’ one might see it as a clumsy ﬁsh instead of recognising
its majesty as it moves apparently eﬀortlessly through the ocean
(Carlson, 2000, 2008). In this approach, with scientiﬁc knowledge in
tow, we are able to appreciate aesthetic qualities that are otherwise
unnoticed or misapprehended. Such knowledge can also enable us to
appreciate ecological processes and ﬁnd value where previously we did
not. For example, coming across the remains of an elk carcass may
appear disgusting, but viewed as part of the necessary process of
decomposition and an ecological cycle, the carcass may come to be seen
as part of a beautiful whole (Rolston, 1998). The carcass may well
reduce our pleasure in a walk, and we might well avoid passing it in
future, but we may still recognise its aesthetic value according to this
approach.
Consider another analogy, the beauty of the human body. An
evolutionary approach might attend to the sexual attractiveness of
potential mates and the diﬀerent degrees of attraction inspired by
diﬀerent members of the opposite sex. Theories of ﬂuctuating asym-
metry alongside Darwin's original ideas of sexual selection imply that
the most attractive individuals are the ones that signal their good
health and ﬁtness through visual features such as good proportion.
There is evidence for the attractiveness of symmetry, along with
‘normalness’, clear sexual dimorphism and, in males, dominance
markers (e.g. Buggio et al., 2012; Puts, 2015). Biological ﬁtness has
an equivalence to Aristotle's virtue applied to non-human objects; they
are both about ideal suitability to the role the tool is expected to play in
life (Nichomachean Ethics III 6). More reﬂective consideration of
human beauty sees past a sexual attractiveness (indicating reproduc-
tive ﬁtness) to the visible signs of character such as the lines of
experience in an old person's face. Here beauty is the expression of the
moral virtue of the human subject. On this analogy the natural world
has an objective beauty to the extent its health, its proper functioning,
is evident (a dazzling display of well-formed ﬂowers would be an
example). On the deeper analogy of the aged face, evidence of the
resilience of nature under wanton human exploitation will be beautiful
to those with eyes to see it (perhaps butterﬂy-bushes in an urban
wasteland). Aldo Leopold included something similar in his ‘Land
Ethic’. He encouraged us to develop our aesthetic sensibility for nature
in order to judge what is ‘esthetically right’, thus suggesting not only a
link between aesthetics and ethics-as-duty, but also the possibility that
the two realms of (non-instrumental) value may be inseparable
(Leopold, 2000: 189).
While knowledge is important for enabling the discovery of value in
nature, its stipulation as a necessary condition for appropriate (or
objective) aesthetic appreciation of nature has led to challenges. Most
relevant to our discussion here is that objectivity can be diﬃcult to
achieve in practice, not least because of the variety and diversity of
experience, background and values that people bring to aesthetic
appreciation of nature (Brady, 2003; Moore, 2008; Parsons, 2008).
Approaches that allow for more diversity and, speciﬁcally, jettison the
requirement of knowledge of the sciences, include those which
emphasise intersubjectivity of aesthetic values (Brady, 2003, 2016).
Intersubjectivity is initially evidenced by observed agreements
between individual aesthetic judgments at the scale of societies or
communities. Individual judgments may have their own particular
inﬂections based on a person's speciﬁc background knowledge, experi-
ence, emotions, etc., yet nonetheless agreement and connections with
other individual aesthetic judgments of the same aesthetic subject
matter come to be established. The explanation for this shared
aesthetic judgement is not the happenstance of individuals agreeing.
The aesthetic judgements of individuals of particular natural occur-
rences, e.g. a speciﬁc local landscape, will be the product of the
historical development of general aesthetic sensibilities in society,
scientiﬁc knowledge, local tradition and the actual features of the
landscape, their health and disposition. In addition to these, which may
be largely unspoken in their application to the landscape in question, a
debate may be generated by a development threat, say, or the arrival of
some researchers applying deliberative methods. Such debate may lead
to the acknowledgement of diﬀerences of opinion, but will also lead to
deeper, more thoughtful judgements. These will be supported, among
other things, by forms of testimony and proof anchored in the
perception of aesthetic qualities (Sibley, 2001). Forms of aesthetic
conversation and discussion (for example, telling stories about shared
experiences, e.g. of the sea, or reﬂecting on a beautiful sunset) do more
than reveal agreement in our judgments because they educate,
elucidate and enrich shared intersubjective judgements of beauty. If
conversations stray from aesthetics to ethics this will be no novelty. The
Enlightenment concept of disinterestedness was initially put to use in
moral philosophy and then applied to aesthetics (Rind, 2002; Stolnitiz,
1961). Against the tradition of Hobbesian egoism, moral philosophy of
the time emphasised benevolence and right action, whether or not it
was in one's personal interest. By extension, something is judged to be
beautiful, whether or not the beholder has any personal or other
interest in it (e.g., economic).
In this way aesthetic value acts as an indicator of a non-instru-
mental value that justiﬁes a duty of care for the natural world,
irrespective of self-interest or human beneﬁt. The links between ethics
and aesthetics have more recently found their way into environmental
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aesthetics through ‘aesthetic preservationism’ (Fisher, 2003). This view
holds that the sensitive perception characteristic of aesthetic attention
and the discovery of beauty, majesty and so on in the natural world, can
instil in us a care and respect for nature. In this way, a kind of aesthetic
awareness potentially feeds into ethical attitudes and forms of envir-
onmental action (Hargrove, 1989; Hettinger, 2007; Lintott, 2006). The
valuing of aesthetic qualities in a landscape may be cited as a
motivating factor in any moral actions to protect it. This echoes
Leopold's Land Ethic that brings aesthetic and ethical value together
through what is ‘esthetically right’.
This analysis has traced a line of thought very diﬀerent from that of
VES. Nature may or may not be seen as embracing human culture, but
its aesthetic value lies not primarily in its delivery of beneﬁts, such as
uplifted spirits, but in a beauty that is judged to lie in aesthetic
qualities. Aesthetic judgement is non-instrumental and objective to the
extent that the interests of the observer are set aside and appeal is
made to reasons and methods of proof appropriate to aesthetics, e.g.,
identiﬁcation of aesthetic qualities and perceptual proof (Brady, 2003;
Sibley, 2001). It is not surprising if this leads to common judgements
that survive the ‘test of time’. This idea, which originates in Hume and
has been widely discussed in aesthetics, suggests that works of art
which have been admired for generations come to belong to a canon of
great art. Similarly, we ﬁnd something like a set of natural places,
species, etc., which have become deeply valued over time and across
communities, as evidenced by forms of legal protection and designa-
tions such as national parks and World Heritage sites. These legal
protections may be seen as the practical application of the duty of care
derived at least in part from the shared objectivity, or intersubjectivity,
of aesthetic value. We recognise that beauty is a contested concept, but
we would argue that it remains relevant in ecological thinking and in
our aesthetic and spiritual relations with the natural world.
Aesthetics is an academic discipline very diﬀerent to religious
studies or theology, usually allocated to disparate university depart-
ments. Our analysis in this section retains this distinction, but in
practice the distinction is hard to maintain. Several observe that
cultural dimensions of ecosystems come bundled together (Chan
et al., 2012a; Klain et al., 2014; Milcu, 2013; Plieninger et al., 2013),
as our examination of wilderness later will demonstrate. There is an
overlap and gradation from beauty to the holy (Coates et al., 2014) that
deserves exploration elsewhere. Such a project should look at the
frequency with which Western atheist intellectuals turn to landscape
beauty to compensate for the loss of the transcendent or noumenal in
nature (Diﬀey, 1993; contrast Brady, 2013).
2.2. Spiritual conceptions of nature and value
Before considering how nature is conceived spiritually, it is useful to
establish what we mean by ‘spiritual’, at least in a Western context.
Deﬁnitions of the religious and spiritual in disciplines such as sociology
and anthropology are highly varied and context dependent. They will
be stretched in one direction if the aim is to encompass the full range of
global cultures; and stretched in another direction if they are used in
debates over secularisation and the putative superiority of the spiritual
over the religious (Ammerman, 2013; Swinton and Pattison, 2010).
Most of the research into the ‘spiritual’ has been undertaken with
respect to ﬁelds such as health or psychology and little with respect to
the natural world (e.g. Rowson, 2014, in Britain; unlike in North
America, e.g. Fredrickson and Anderson, 1999; Warber and Irvine,
2008; Zueﬂe, 1999). Inspection of the ecosystem services literature
suggests that ‘spiritual value’ is used without reference to these
debates. Instead it is deliberately unspeciﬁc so that it can encompass
values within practised religions of all sorts together with those values
that are akin to them, while lacking religious features such as belief in
god(s) or organised structures. Recent studies of spiritual value that
involve interviewing or questioning local people often proﬀer sentences
to elicit responses. Such sentences may begin, “I value this place
because …”, the ‘becauses’ covering a diversity of potential values.
Under the category of spiritual, a sample of texts of such sentences
include: “I feel part of something that is greater than myself; feel more
connected to nature; I gain perspective on life” (Bryce et al., 2016 in
this issue); “they are a sacred, religious, or spiritually special place to
me or because I feel reverence and respect for nature there” (Ancona
et al., 2016; Brown, 2013); “inspires me to be aware of forces or entities
larger than myself. This can be the basis for both negative and positive
feelings including emotions like awe, reverence, humility, and even
fear” (Klain et al., 2014).
Any working deﬁnition should be speciﬁc to the culture of the
people whose valuations are being sought. Within the Western tradi-
tion the main religion has been Christianity in all its diversity. For
example, data from the 2011 Census for England and Wales (Oﬃce for
National Statistics, 2012) records approximately 59% Christian, 25%
no religion, 7% not stated, 9% other religions. If many of those who
self-identify as of no religion are descended from those brought up as
Christian, that would imply that over 80% are likely to conceive of the
religious or spiritual in a Christian or post-Christian frame, dissenting
and dissociating themselves from it to varying degrees. We shall focus
on this frame, though we acknowledge the substantial minority, which
has grown steadily in Britain since World War Two, who belong to
other religions. Proportions will diﬀer in other European countries and
North America, but the overall picture is likely to be similar. The
Census data show a rapid decline in the proportion of people who claim
to be Christian and there is a similar decline in church attendance.
Some have described a shift from organised religion to new spiritualties
(Heelas and Woodhead, 2005). A widespread sense that the spiritual
has taken over from the religious may, in part, lie behind the term
‘spiritual value’ of ecosystems, alongside a wish to respect the diversity
of practised religions. The informal and semi-organised practice of
nature spirituality, together with earth-based spirituality and the
varieties of modern Paganism, might be expected to grow. However,
the numbers involved appear small as Shterin (2007) points out in
reviewing Heelas and Woodhead. More widespread may be attitudes to
nature that are developments derived from Christian thought and a
persistent undertow of paganism. In the western regions of Britain and
Ireland the Celtic heritage of a close relationship with nature, including
its expression in Celtic Christianity, remains a lively tradition (Bradley,
1999; MacInnes, 1950, 1982).
The diversity in the spiritual stances in post-Christendom Britain
can usefully be understood using Taylor's (2007) nuanced analysis of
secularisation in Western societies, typifying it into three forms.
Secularity-3 is his term for the loss of innocence of belief in today's
world (secularity-1 is secularity in the public space; secularity-2 is the
decline in religious belief and practice). Whatever a person believes,
one way or another, they have done this as a choice, aware of the other
choices they could have made. In practice, not surprisingly, people
come to hold a diversity of beliefs gathered from various sources – and
not necessarily consistent with each other. These are all ways of
handling the experience Taylor calls ‘fullness’, the ‘something more’
that materialist and reductionist language is not adequate to express.
There is also the recognition that the answers to some questions
inevitably lie beyond us, and that there is much we do not even know
we do not know. Swept up into the ‘spiritual’, then, though not
necessarily named as such, might include a recognition of this ‘full-
ness’, and things like an appreciation of the integrity of animal life, as
well as on-going religious practices.
The international literature that mentions spiritual with ecosystems
tends to view the spiritual functionally, e.g. what psychological or social
function ‘spiritual’ encounters play, or even categorise the beneﬁt as
provision of spiritual information (Chiesura and de Groot, 2003). This
coheres with an economic perspective that views nature primarily as a
resource. Consistent with this conception, Natural England (2009)
provides the following deﬁnition of the spiritual in a UK context: “a
deep-seated, harder-to-access value, often delivered in more solitary
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moments; could be delivered by iconic wildlife, or a single feature tree,
as well as by more traditional features such as burial mounds, standing
stones, or churches. Also associated with water (still lakes or slow-
moving streams and rivers) and with high places; can be created by the
weather, such as a dramatic shaft of light or particular colours” (p6)
(compare Radford and James, 2013). Note here the terminology of
‘delivery’ that assumes an ecosystem is the provider. It may almost be
expected that, if park-keepers have done their job properly, nature is
guaranteed to deliver. Contrast this with the view that spiritual
experiences do not come to order at our bidding, being gifts from
‘the beyond’ when we are spiritually open to receive them. Yet the
choice of the word ‘spiritual’ in VES literature over, say, ‘psychological
value’ implies much more than just improving mental well-being.
Although spiritual approaches to nature, such as a meditative walk,
may increase contentment and be motivated in part by the desire to be
able to ‘live with myself’, to undertake them with the aim of increasing
personal happiness is to subvert them. Rowson (2014) has recently
marshalled arguments that happiness can only be a by-product. The
essence of spirituality in this view is self-giving, a setting aside of
personal desires. In this, spirituality joins forces with traditional
religion. For those who espouse spiritual value, a Total Economic
Valuation (TEV) is likely to be judged a very partial aﬀair (Paavola and
Adger, 2005). The TEV, as an acknowledgement of all that nature does
for us, is more welcome than a disregarding of nature, but it does not
recognise the reciprocal duties of humans within the natural world,
duties that may come at various levels of cost and human dis-beneﬁt.
Spiritual practices such as sacriﬁce and fasting would be examples of
costly behaviour that are contrary to preference satisfaction, as are
caring interventions. The normative ethical paradigm of religion has
traditionally not been consequentialist. Its injunctions have been
towards enhancing virtues such as care for others, or have been
deontological, emphasising duties towards others and recognising their
rights. Concomitantly, value lies in the ﬂourishing of the other, rather
than in their value to me.
Spiritual values can be characterised as transcendental values, in
that they are fundamental conceptions of the relationships of humans
and nature (Kenter et al., 2015; Raymond and Kenter, 2016 in this
issue). Sometimes people may not be aware that they hold these values
until they are evoked by an apparent threat or until they are elicited by
sensitive group work (Kenter et al., 2016c in this issue). People may
also be reluctant to express them for fear of social embarrassment or
shame in talking about religion in public or of ridicule for holding such
views in an increasingly secularist society.
If the spiritual conception of value contrasts with that of VES
literature, so does its conception of nature. Orthodox Christianity
conceives of humans as creatures among others in a Creation brought
into being by God. Each part is related to every other and God delights
and cares for the whole. Although some Christians have taken the
powerful and distinct role of humans as a ‘permit to despoil’ (White,
1967), others subsequently argued this understanding is deeply mis-
taken and that humans are merely stewards, ultimately accountable to
God for their exercise of their de facto dominion on behalf of the rest of
creation (Whitney, 2015). Some theologians go further to argue that
stewardship itself is inadequate (e.g. Palmer, 1992) as it perpetuates a
managerial model of the human relationship to the rest of creation.
Modern paganism generally sees a unity of nature and the divine, the
Mother of us all, humans and the rest. It tends to be critical of
Christianity for elevating the role of humans, providing a justiﬁcation
for human exploitation. Those without a doctrinal system, when asked
about their spiritual experiences often speak of a connectedness to
nature (e.g. Kenter, 2016 in this issue). Though other responses include
feelings of awe and insigniﬁcance before a larger reality (e.g. Keniger
et al., 2013), maybe uncomfortably so. LeVasseur (2011) describes the
radical existential dependency and debt to nature that generates a
sense of shame, a shame only ritual can assuage (see also Trainor
(2006), Winthrop (2014)). Daniel et al. (2012) write there is a risk of
underestimating the spiritual. Surely an understatement, for to reduce
the rest of nature to the status of a resource feels a sacrilege in the face
of such awe.
3. Interpretation of cultural evidence illustrating aesthetic
and spiritual values
In the argument so far, we have argued, on a conceptual level, that
both spiritual and aesthetic evaluations of nature include recognition of
some ﬂow of beneﬁt to humans but that the stronger dynamic is in the
opposite direction – the duties humans have towards nature. This is
partially due to their conceptions of nature, which are very diﬀerent to
that of VES literature, while diﬀering also from each other. Aesthetic
judgements often acknowledge the anthropogenic origin of patterns
and features of nature (as in a rural landscape), yet there can also be a
strong strand that sets the natural apart from the human, such as in the
language of wilderness. However, either way, aesthetic evaluations are
dominated by the conception of humans as the assessors of natural
beauty, rather than as recipients of products or beneﬁts. Spiritual
conceptions typically aﬃrm the oneness of people with nature, a
creature among the creation or the experience of a deep connectedness.
Alongside this there may be a recognition that humans have a
distinctive role within nature as, likewise, other creatures have (each
species having a distinctive ecological niche). Part of the distinctive role
of humans is a lively moral awareness that means human interactions
with the world can never be morally neutral, but are under judgement:
does this interaction contribute to the ﬂourishing of the whole? The
consequences of human actions are not merely cause and eﬀect, from
which humans can learn to manipulate the world to their advantage,
but nature's response categorised as blessing or retribution.
We now wish to test these conceptual analyses against the cultural
evidence around us in society. This is the method of ‘inspection’ or
‘interpretation’ tabulated in Kenter et al. (2014). The cultural evidence
available for inspection is highly diverse. The contemporary scene of
nature writing is particularly rich (Cowley, 2008), with several major
names in Britain (e.g. Jamie, Macfarlane, Jay, Croker, Mabey), with
many lesser-known writers besides. The journal EarthLines; the
Culture of Nature provides a platform for this work. In this literature
readers encounter diverse evaluations of nature (e.g. Jamie, 2008,
slates Macfarlane). Nevertheless, all these evaluations are deep,
touching on both aesthetic and spiritual dimensions, and contest
reductions of value to money. The interest of contemporary art lies
no longer in landscape painting. The energy is in placing artworks in
environmental settings, setting them free in nature, sometimes with the
explicit anticipation of their disarticulation and absorption into the
world around them (e.g. the work of Antony Gormley, Patricia
Johanson). Art that addresses environmental issues has become main-
stream in recent years (Brown, 2014; Kastner and Wallis, 2003).
Edwards et al. (2016 in this issue) report on socially transforming art
that integrates environmental or ecological concerns and on how arts-
led deliberative practices can illuminate CES. In addition to art and
literature, there is also more day-to-day culture. There would be value
in future detailed analyses of genres like gardening, television nature
programmes, village signs, street names and jigsaw puzzles. Bieling and
Plieninger (2013) provide an exemplary analysis of artefacts in the
Alps, while Lewis (1979) provides guidance on how to ‘read’ a land-
scape, interpreting the way conceptions of nature are inscribed upon it.
Ethnographic studies of village activities through the year would also
be illuminating. Adequate accounts of these discourses cannot be
merely prosaic descriptions, but will be richly woven narratives as in
the widely-admired model of Schama's Landscape and Memory
(2004).
We have chosen, for reasons of space, to sample just one conceptual
presentation of nature, one ‘trope’, in contemporary discourse, that of
‘wilderness’. This is just one way among many of writing and speaking
about nature in contemporary Western culture. This inspection method
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owes much to the discipline of ecocriticism (a branch of literary
criticism) that examines how the more-than-human features in literary
and other cultural productions. One approach of ecocriticism is to trace
the concepts of human-nature relations and how these cluster into a
typology of tropes. Our chosen trope is amongst the chapter headings
in the textbook on this subject by Garrard (2012), alongside other well-
used labels like ‘Romantic’, ‘Pastoral’ and ‘Apocalyptic’. What does an
inspection of ‘wilderness’ reveal about presuppositions in talk of nature
and value? The rest of this section explores the concept of wilderness as
an example of the application of the interpretive method.
It is unsurprising that humans may judge beautiful a landscape that
is obviously productive – waving corn or fat sheep (consider Psalm 72).
It is more striking that, with the Modern period of Western culture, the
appreciation grew of the beauty of the unproductive. From being the
haunt of demons, mountains came to be appreciated as sublime
(Nicolson, 1959). The Romantic Movement developed this sensitivity
in its critique of the industrial and the domestic. The elevation of the
English Lakeland into a sacred landscape was contemporaneous with
the industrialisation of the northern mill-towns of nearby Lancashire.
North America possessed vast tracts of apparently empty land to the
eyes of European immigrants. (The indigenous people were made
‘invisible’ through physical ejection and through conceptually categor-
ising them among the ‘natural’.) The ‘Wild West’ could be treated as
new territory to be incorporated into the European economy by
pushing the Frontier ever westwards. For others, though, it was seen
as a pristine land, in which one could reconnect with values that had
been lost in the main culture (Nash, 1982). The Frontier should bypass
these places, leaving them behind the moving front as reservations,
National Parks, within a country dedicated to the pursuit of happiness.
John Muir (1838–1914) was the primary campaigner for the
National Parks. A Scots immigrant to the USA, he was enraptured by
the wild and so motivated to campaign to preserve it (Worster, 2008).
His nature writing and journals reveal aesthetic, spiritual and scientiﬁc
values in many of his descriptions, such as of the Sierra Nevada:
No Sierra landscape that I have seen holds anything truly dead or
dull, …; everything is perfectly clean and pure and full of divine
lessons. This quick, inevitable interest attaching to everything
seems marvellous until the hand of God becomes visible; then it
seems reasonable that what interests Him may well interest us
(Muir, 1911).
Passages such as this reﬂect overlaps between aesthetic and
spiritual values, though not drawn in narrowly theological terms. The
Calvinism of his youth was replaced with ‘a biocentric wilderness
theology rooted in a consciousness of the sacrality of wild nature’
(Oelschlaeger, 1991). Respect for creatures and nature emerges
through his embodied experience of the mountains. The wide inﬂuence
of his ideas, including his controversial emphasis on ‘pristine wild-
erness’ (Cronon, 1996), points to how his environmental values have
been shared over time and across continents. They lie behind the VES
concept of spiritual value for Westerners, that there must be places
where people can recover from the ‘burdens of urbanism’ (Satterﬁeld
et al., 2013) and receive the spiritual beneﬁts implied by the terminol-
ogy of TEEB that we listed at the start. Satterﬁeld et al. (2013) write of
a ‘wilderness aesthetic’ that may imply people ought to experience it in
this way, an overlapping of beauty and the spiritual.
In his debates with the Conservationist position of Giﬀord Pinchot,
a sort of wise-use position, Muir was clear that wilderness areas
possessed their meaning and value in not-being-useful (Worster,
2008). Pinchot was advocating a scientiﬁc and technical approach to
maximise the eﬃcient use of natural resources for the public – a
forerunner of the cost-beneﬁt analysis. His primary conﬂict was against
‘interests’ or ‘monopoly’, but responded to Muir on a second front
(Hayes, 1959). Muir, as a Preservationist, pressed that national parks
should bear almost no evidence of human activity. The typical visitor
was to be a hiker through this landscape, an observer, who was
redeemed by the freshness of what she saw. In this way, although in
origin a protest against ‘nature as utility’, this wilderness approach
became vulnerable to utilitarian capture. The wise-users can claim that
wilderness has value through providing spiritual renewal and happi-
ness, even if the precise monetary metric is hard to calculate. The wild
is also incorporated into the consumer economy through the provision
of visitor centres, trail guides and wild-camping equipment. This
illustrates the double-bind of ecotourism. Its promotion requires the
remoteness and absence of people the visitors crave (Scottish Natural
Heritage, 2012). And yet its ﬁnancial viability depends on easy access
and many purchasers of its marketable products.
The wilderness trope has gained new strength in Europe through
the re-wilding movement. Ostensibly, this arises from developments in
the science of ecology. This has brought new understandings of the
need for disturbance regimes to maintain ecosystems (Frelich et al.,
2002), of the need for extensive protected areas to reduce the negative
consequences for vulnerable species of habitat fragmentation and edge-
eﬀects (Lindenmayer and Fischer, 2006), and of the pre-agricultural
wildwood being, arguably, more like a savannah than a forest, kept
open by large grazing mammals (Kirby and Watkins, 2015; but
contested by Mitchell, (2005) and others). This movement argues for
the set-aside of large tracts of land into which large herbivores and top
carnivores like wolves can be released and natural processes allowed to
run wild (Monbiot, 2014; Taylor, 2005). It may be that enthusiasm for
rewilding is more prevalent among nature conservationists than the
general public. Buijs et al. (2011) draw on Cultural Resonance and
Social Representation theories to analyse conﬂicts in the Netherlands.
Here the National Forest Service has adopted a wilderness representa-
tion of nature, which has limited cultural resonance. The local protest
group has framed the conﬂict with wider notions of nature that
embrace more than the apparently-untouched.
The rewilding movement is vulnerable to a charge of bad faith. It
overlooks the way that landscapes now prized for their wildness arose
through local people having been excluded. In the case of the Scottish
Highlands, witness the Clearances of the nineteenth century (Hunter,
2014), but also the contemporary protests at the actions of the
conservation agencies excluding local people from nature reserves that
had been part of their common patrimony (Mitchell, 1999). Of course,
the whole world cannot be given over to wilderness. But in setting aside
areas for wild nature, the danger is that it leaves the rest to be
exploited. “Nature Reserves are ghettos where we can segregate unused
species, terrain too wild to be useful, and images of a bygone era”
(Cooper, 2000b). This example interpretation has revealed one simi-
larity between wilderness and VES languages; they both emphasise the
notion of nature as something apart from humans. As to value,
wilderness language is ambivalent. In the hands of a John Muir it is
a powerful call to protect nature from the depredations of human use,
an argument that humans have a duty to protect it in and of itself. Yet,
for those who have come to see wild areas as places where they can feel
spiritually refreshed, the wild is delivering a service that beneﬁts them,
and they are prepared to pay for travel to such places, for waterproofs
and cameras, and a willingness-to-pay represented by their subscrip-
tions to nature conservation organisations – the John Muir Trust
among them.
4. Interpretive-deliberative evidence
Is there also corroborative evidence for the analysis of this paper
from deliberative exercises? Here we use data from investigations with
a diﬀerent natural focus, the sea, where humans may readily describe
themselves as feeling closer to nature. Although, of course, there is
overlap; the sea can be place that evokes many of the values connected
with the concept of wildness. Evidence from deliberative exercises
around the value of the marine environment for seaside communities
and recreational marine users supports the case that people conceive of
nature with themselves as integral within it. Their expressions of
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aesthetic and spiritual value are about care and respect, and not merely
about having nice feelings.
Case study research using deliberative approaches was conducted
as part of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment Follow-on work (in
this issue: Kenter et al., 2016a, 2016b and 2016c; Orchard-Webb et al.,
2016). Participants were asked to speak of their personal experience of
the sea in the form of story-telling in a small group setting. A content
analysis of the narratives revealed a diversity of value types including
expressions of aesthetic and spiritual value.
Aesthetic values emerged regularly from divers through explicit
descriptions of what they saw. Some statements entwined emotional
responses and spiritual values illustrating the connections between
aesthetic and spiritual accounts: “I went for just a little dive under a
pier. It was covered in life, the sun was shining, clear green blue, little
bits of kelp, then two huge rays came past, it was like paradise. It was
just a silly little shallow dive but it was magic. The most beautiful were
the anemones and the plants. It was exquisite”. A resident of a seaside
community: “the atmosphere; the ﬂat calm sea, the sun setting, the
whole thing about canoeing along on a dead ﬂat sea and the ﬁsh all
around me. It was an amazing sensation, and that was about connect-
ing with nature and being part of nature”.
During the storytelling, people frequently described “feeling part of
something larger”. One diver recalled “magic moment with cuttleﬁsh…
you realise there's intelligence there, and there's a connection”.
Another diver described being surrounded by seals “I am part of this.
I am not just watching”. Story-tellers also explained how their
experiences had given them meaning, “look at all the things we’ve
done, the relics, we mined, the ﬁsherman's huts we’ve left behind. It
makes you reﬂect on things”. Another: “I felt the beauty but also felt
sadness, because where had all the ﬁsh gone? They were there in the
past but not there anymore”. Such stories show how individuals can
evoke values that underpin a duty of care towards nature. A seaside
community member explained “I think just being by the sea…it inspires
us, it's inspiring, isn’t it? ” These are statements of implicit spiritual
value.
Explicit statements of spiritual value were less common but one
diver described his experience “like a cathedral I ticked all of these
[values] and more, I added religious which is strange really because I
am an atheist. I was in one place and visibility opened up and it was
like a cathedral, with jewel anemones lighting up everywhere. I felt like
I was in the presence of God, if there is such a thing. I was crying when
I came out of the water”. Another diver: “It clears my mind, it's
meditative.” One seaside community participant said “[I]t's a spiritual
experience every time I go to the sea, especially if I’m sad or upset, I
just go and sit there and watch it”. Another explained why they “they
wouldn’t live anywhere else; it has to be by the sea… It's God given and
something we should appreciate more”.
This ﬁnal statement encapsulates the respect and concern that is
conveyed by the story-tellers for the sea. Following the stories,
participants were asked which transcendental values were most evoked
by their experience; ‘protecting the environment’ and ‘enjoying life/
pleasure’ were those (Schwartz and Jerusalem, 1994) most frequently
highlighted. They often expressed feeling as though they were a part of
nature, rather than talking about it as a resource, illustrating how
aesthetic and spiritual values were neither instrumental nor conse-
quentialist.
5. Discussion
This paper has argued that at least in respect to aesthetic and
spiritual values for environmental places and wildlife an economic,
instrumental and consequentialist account of those values is not
suﬃcient (compare Luck et al., 2012; Stokols, 1990). This is because
aesthetic and spiritual values emerge from (and, in turn, shape)
discourses that have diﬀerent ontological conceptions of nature and
diﬀerent axiological conceptions of the value relationships between
nature and humans (also see Fish et al., 2016a in this issue). The
ontological claim of our conceptual analysis coincides with the ﬁndings
of Flint et al. (2013) that VES articulates the view of nature as separate
from humans and as open to human utilisation. This is merely one of
their multi-dimensional array of human-nature conceptions, including
those that integrate humans within nature (Flint et al., 2013) or see
humans having a kinship with nature (Gould et al., 2015). Setten et al.
(2012), from a landscape perspective, agree that nature and society are
not truly separate, but that the VES framework takes people ‘out of the
world’. Bieling (2014) reports how the stories her German participants
told assigned a ‘personal agency’ role to nature as well as to humans.
Fischer and Eastwood (2016) argue that ‘co-production’ best expresses
the interactions of humans and places in the construction of ecosystem
processes and services and also of meaning and value. Klain et al.
(2014) report that their Canadian respondents used metaphors in
describing the sea that did not align with ecosystems as service
providers. Ontologically, in the realm of aesthetics and the spiritual,
as in these social science investigations of communities, humans are
immersed in nature and nature is not conceived of as a sort of machine
that humans manage in order to for it to generate products.
Axiologically we have made three claims. Firstly, aesthetic and
spiritual values do not have to be solely individual preferences –
matters of artistic taste and freedom of religion. Instead, they are often
socially shared values, frequently intersubjective, and the outcome of
historical processes in shared cultures, as shown by our analysis. In this
claim we endorse the ﬁndings, amongst others, of other papers in this
special issue, especially Edwards et al. (2016), Irvine et al. (2016) and
Kenter et al., (2016b); and also Kenter et al. (2015). Secondly, these
values are independent of human preferences according to aesthetic
theories of disinterestedness or the spiritual dimension of nature.
These values are not primarily instrumental, for individual or group
human beneﬁt (though there may be some emotional beneﬁts). Our
speciﬁc aesthetic and spiritual claims echo the arguments of others for
non-instrumental values, e.g. relational (Chan et al., 2016) or consti-
tutive (James, 2015). These values are closely related to the transcen-
dental values that Raymond and Kenter (2016 in this issue) argue
underpin framings of nature and ascription of meaning. These non-
instrumental values do not lie in the domain of economics. They might
fall within the socio-cultural domain of Martín-Lópeza et al. (2014) in
their call for a multi-dimensional framework for ecosystem services.
We consider they are better allocated to the domain of ‘principles’ in
Chan et al. (2012b), who erect a tripartite taxonomy of principles,
preferences and virtues, developing Sagoﬀ's contrast of principle- and
preference-based ethics (e.g. Sagoﬀ, 1998).
The implication of this, thirdly, is that the axiological relationship is
not primarily one of nature being in service to human desires, rather
the ethical relationship is reversed: the duty of humans is towards
nature. (This is particularly the case with spiritual value, but aesthetic
values can be thought of as generating a duty of recognition.) This
reciprocity is evidenced in the ﬁeld by Comberti et al. (2015) in
traditional societies, Kato (2006) in Japan, while in Britain, Fish and
Saratsi (2015) report participants expressing the view that it is actually
a privilege to look after nature. This is close to the concept of
stewardship (e.g. Jobstvogt et al., 2014), although even this may be
too anthropocentric for some. The ethical emphasis has shifted from
consequentialism to deontology, a moral framework of rights and
duties. These are incommensurate and cannot be simply aggregated
(Chan et al., 2012b; Winthrop, 2014). For this reason, VES approaches
struggle to incorporate rights and duties.
In cases where there are environmental beneﬁts (e.g. from attrac-
tive views or emotional highs) some attempts may be made to
incorporate these into a TEV, at least through a contingent valuation
exercise. Another attempt to include them is to categorise them as
existence value: how much are people willing to pay to preserve a rare
species, say, just in order to know it continues to exist, even though
they will never see it? This adaptation-by-expansion of the TEV
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taxonomy demonstrates that economics is not an unfeeling science,
indiﬀerent to higher, non-use values. Yet, even here, theoretically what
is valued is the personal beneﬁt (e.g. a good feeling) the respondent
receives from this knowledge and not the actual existence of the rare
species (Housman, 2012). Turner et al. (2003) write that arguably
existence value lies outside the scope of conventional economics. It is
not surprising if respondents protest at being asked to put a monetary
value on the continued existence of a species, oﬀering either inﬂated
ﬁgures or refusing to provide any ﬁgures at all (Chan et al., 2011;
Kumar and Kumar, 2008; Raymond and Kenter, 2016 in this issue).
What is intuited as a duty by the respondents is treated as a personal
preference by the contingent valuation. This category error confounds
an appropriate reply.
If aesthetic and spiritual values cannot be adequately incorporated
into a TEV, that poses problems for the management of trade-oﬀs – or
conﬂicts (Jax et al., 2013), a term that avoids prejudging a method of
solution. Here we join forces with critics of the universal applicability
of economic trade-oﬀs (e.g. Ernstson, 2013; Raymond et al., 2014;
Paavola and Adger, 2005; Winthrop, 2014). That is, supposing value
aggregation is ever ‘fair’ – Hockley (2014) draws attention to Kenneth
Arrow's ‘Impossibility Theorem’, that it is impossible to devise an
aggregation of individual preferences that satisﬁes certain minimal
procedural standards. Clashing values are no longer a technical,
optimisation problem, an uncontested trade-oﬀ. Instead, they call for
hard-won compromises, debated socially and politically. Especially
where the relationship is primarily one of spiritual duty, to trade-oﬀ
that duty will be sacrilegious. This is not to excuse aesthetic and
spiritual values from tough choices, they will still have to be made, but
the decisions cannot be delegated to numerical calculations from
gathered data (Holland, 2002). If aesthetic and spiritual values exist
alongside other value systems, this would suggest that a plurality of
discourses will need to be maintained right up to the point of a decision
being made (Raymond et al., 2014, in advocating the deliberative
paradigm, suggest participants/valuers and decision-makers should be
one and the same). This would be no novel experience as in society
there are many decision-making procedures that handle a multiplicity
of incommensurable arguments: court cases, planning appeals, board-
room decisions, daily life. Religious groups are used to managing
conﬂicts between economic constraints and their core principles and
they have often developed formal or informal deliberative procedures
that facilitate the expression of individual preferences in contexts that
lead to those preferences being subsumed into decisions that express
the shared values of the group as a whole. The political process itself
has to adjudicate between contrasting accounts and conﬂicting interest
groups. Environmental decisions are no diﬀerent.
In addition to its argument, this paper has also illustrated an arts
and humanities approach to VES studies, demonstrating both style and
method. In style, we have been unearthing and critiquing assumptions
(Coates et al., 2014), particularly through conceptual analysis. In
method we have drawn on disciplines such as landscape studies
(Schaich et al., 2010) and literary criticism (Dudley and Coates, 2014
– annex 3) to examine and interpret cultural productions, paying most
attention ourselves to literature. There is yet a rich vein of theological
enquiry to explore (e.g. Brown, 2004; Inge, 2003). However, in
addition to examining ‘high culture’, we advocate work examining the
vernacular. Substantial and funded eﬀorts are now being made in the
social sciences to bring into full awareness the voices and values of a
great diversity of people. However, less work has been commissioned to
provide narratives of the values of nature that lie ready for inspection
and interpretation in the cultural productions around us. Coates et al.
(2014) emphasised that cultural meanings and values emerge from
particular contexts over time, and as such they are rich and complex,
resisting forms of reduction. They also articulated the ways in which
the arts and humanities can contribute to a better understanding of the
cultural dynamics that are reductively referred to as cultural ecosystem
services. That understanding assumes that cultural relationships arise
from complex interactions between humans and nature over time and
that aesthetic and spiritual values, for example, should not be
consigned to the ‘intangible’ and ‘immaterial’, when these terms are
viewed as problematic in the VES literature (Coates et al., 2014).
Substantial funding is also needed for the creative aspect of arts and
humanities, their examination of what is emerging in society and their
contribution to that emergence – or the recovery of what has been lost
from the past. As more conceptual analyses and cultural studies are
forthcoming, they will also need to be communicated in fora where
other evaluations of ecosystems are at play. Both those writing and
those reading will need to attend to each other if the complexity and
richness of the relationships of humans and the other-than-human are
to play their proper role in decision-making.
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